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Abstract 
Many unique problems have been encountered and overcome in the 
developmental .testing of nuclear powered engines for s .pacE'. 
applications, necessitating an extensive radiological and cryo-
genic safety program at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station •. 
(NRDS) The radiological safety program directs itself toward the 
protection of personnel associated with the program and the public 
from direct radiation and resultant radioactive effluent. The . 
cryogenics safety program at the NRDS directs itself to the 
prevention of accidents which could damage the nuclear reactor or 
the test facilities and in turn endanger associated personnel. 
It is graphically illustrated that nuclear rocket engines do not 
present a radiological safety problem prior to operation, and ·that 
during and following operation, experience has proven that control 
measures are possible to minimize possible hazards. Of partic-
ular interest is the comparison of cryogenic and radiological 
safety effects. 
Introduction 
The nuclear rocket (ROVER) program is a joint program of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U. S. 
.\tomic Energy Commission, under the management and direction of 
the joint AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. The HOVER 
Program is concerned with developing the technology and systems 
for using nuclear propulsion for space missions. 
Space launch vehicles of today are all propelled by chemical 
rockets operating on the combustion principle. The earliest source 
of power providing greater performance than today's most advanced 
chemical rocket engines is the nuclear rocket engine. 
A new program such as nuclear rocket development causes 
need !'or a new look at safety considerations. Unique among those 
to iH' considered during development trsting of nuclear systrms 
arr nuclear safety and cryogenic safety in addition to the more 
conventional and better understood considerations of industrial 
safety. 
This presentation will address itself to each of these safety 
topics as they are practiced at the Nuclear Rocket Uevclopmen! 
Station (NRDS). 
The Nuclear Rocket Development Station b the national sitr 
for conducting full scale tests of nuclear rocket reactors and 
engines and, eventually, complete stages in the United States' 
program to develop nuclear-propelled spacecraft for deep space 
flight. The station is a 90,000-acre sitr located approximately 90 
miles northwest of Las V cgas, Nevada. (Figure 1) The plant value 
of test facilities at the NHUS is approximately $85,000,000 and 
includes two r.eactor trst cells, "A" and "C"; an enginr tr s t 
stand, ETS-1; a reactor maintenanee, assembly and disassemhly 
building, R-MAD; and an engine maintrnancr, assembly and 
disassembly building, E-MAD. A two-position rngin<' 'stage trsl 
facility is presently under design. 
The basie differrnce hrtween a nuclear propul s ion system and 
the more conventional chemical propulsion sysl!'m i8 in the method 
of heating the propellant to provide thrust. The chemiC·al rol'kct 
opcr-ates on a comhustion principle where fuel and oxidizer are 
combined and burn. The resultant exhaust gases provide the thrust. 
A nuclear system uses a nuclear reactor to heat an extremely cold 
liquid propellant with a high expansion ratio and channel s the 
resulting hot gas through a nozzle lo provide thrust. So you can 
see we do not burn our propellant, we merely heat it. (Figure 2) 
llasically what we have is liquid hydrogen hcing pumpPd from 
a propellant tank through a super-hot rraclor, or heat exchanger, 
expanded and exhausted to provide thrust. The pump is turbine 
drivt'n and is run by a portion of the hot rxhaust gases bled off 
upstream of the nozzle. This is tht' common "bleed cycle" that 
permits the "boot-strap" start- up with which you arc probably 
familiar. As the liquid hydrogen passes through the hot reactor 
(approximately 4000° F.) it is heated to extreme temperature. The 
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hot exhaust gas is then directed and expanded by the nozzle to 
produce useful thr1_1st. Nuclear radiation is produced by the reactor, 
however, an engine shield reduces radiation --levels to engine 
components, the vehicle and the payload. (Figure 3) 
Safety at N RDS • 
Unique safety considerations at the Nuclear Rocket Develop-
ment Station are nuclear safety and cryogenic safety. These are in 
addition to conventional industrial safety practices. 
Industrial Safety 
Industrial safety at the NHDS takes on several unique facets 
which we do not normally think of when we refer to a conventional 
industrial safety program. In our Industrial Program at Jackass 
.Flats, we must, because of the relative hazards of the work, make 
it a preventative program rather than one which acts after the fact. 
We cannot afford to learn from our mistakes. We must insure that 
mistakes are not made to begin with. Besides dealing with the 
regular day to day problems of machinery, traffic, fire protection 
and training, our Industrial Safety Plan plays a strong role in 
occupational and environmental health. Industrial Safety personnel 
must review all plans, processes and procedures for new construc-
tion prior to the beginning of the project. In this way problems 
with volatile, toxic or radioactive substances are .eliminated before 
they occur. 
The Industrial Safety Program must also include provisions for 
assuring that all AEC and NASA contractors located at NRDS are 
kept aware of new Federal codes, regulations and laws and assure, 
through continual audit, that these provisions are correctly inter-
preted and carried out. 
The Industrial Safety Program has initiated and used to great 
advantage a "Near Miss" program, This program involves assuring 
that all NRDS personnel are made aware of serious accidents which 
"almost" occurred. The "Near Miss" hopefully acts as a stimulus 
to employees to assure that dangerous conditions or at:tions will 
be eliminated. 
Industrial safety is also in.strum~ntal in establishing proce-
dures for, and overseeing, all emergency actions which might take 
place at the NRDS. 
Cryogenic and Systems Safety 
A eomplete and comprehensive Cryogenic and Systems Safety 
Program is in effect at the NHUS. The Cryogenic Safety Program 
addr!'s8es itself to th!' three major problt'ms which are associated 
with handling any eryogenic fluid. 
1. Extremely low temperatures reduce ductility and impact 
resistance of most materials on contact. 
2. Confinement results in pressure forming due to vapor-
ization and expansion. 
3. Severe tissue damage results when human tissue is con-
tacted by the cryogenic fluid, its immediate container or resultant 
cold gases. 
In addition, as you know, liquid hydrogen is volatile in air, 
with wide flammability limits. Very low energy is required to ignite 
hydrogen. Hydrogen in its liquid state probably presents us with 
our most serious concerns at the NRDS. Our storage capacity for 
LH2 has grown in the past year from 586,000 gallons to 1,586,000 
and our gas and cryogenic systems are rather complex as shown 
by the simplified flow diagram of a test cell. (Figure 4) 
Although liquid hydrogen is handled daily in large quantities 
at the NRUS in a routine manner, constant awareness of new 
equipment or methods in handling this material is a must. Safety 
codes, based in part on the experience of organizations handling 
hydrogen have been stipulated and are in practical use. These 
codes have evolved from four basic factors: 
1. Knowledge of the potential hazards of the fluid and its 
system. 
2. Personnel education in both the potential hazards and 
the technical aspects of the system. 
3. Assurance tha l specific procedures exist and are followed 
during all hydrogen operations. 
4. Systems engineering to preclude hazards. 
Factor 1 demands that, to be effective, safety codes must be 
based on knowledge of the properties of the fluids to be handled, 
the gases produced by their vaporization and of mixtures which 
occur when the gases disperse into the atmosphere. The properties 
of the materials used to confine the fluids and the response of the 
human body to both the fluids and their resultant gases are essen-
tial considerations. These factors all evolve into the safety codes 
now in use at the NRDS. • 
~actor 2 requires that all super~isory and technical personnel 
workmg on a system have an intimate knowledge of equipment 
arrangements, facility operations and capacities, and systems 
operation. In addition, the interrelationships of all these features 
must be understood so than an effective, efficient and safe day-to-
day working operation may be realized. To assure that competent 
and qualified personnel are available for potentially dangerous 
operations and tests, each affected NRDS organization carries on 
an extensive indoctrination and training program. 
Factor 3 is primarily for use during cryogenics systems tests 
and activation exercises. These tests, whether being performed in 
the immediate lest area or from a remoted control point, are under 
the direct control of test supervisors who have complete and up-
to-date procedures and checklists. One of their primary obligations 
is to maintain strict lest discipline throughout all phases of the 
operation. 
During cryogenics operations, procedures dealing with every 
step of the operation are mandatory. The smallest task if not 
correctly performed could cause an expensive failure to the system 
or the product and jeopardize the lives of operating personnel. 
Let me emphasize before going on to the next factor that 
personnel are not, during reactor or cryogenics op~rations, treated 
as being separate from the system. They arc part of the system 
anJ function as a component. Human factors engineering is as 
important in the overall dC'velopmC'nt of the system as reliability. 
Factor 1 is probably the most important aspect ofthecryogenic 
and system sagely program. The systC'm safety approach is somt'-
what different from that normally praC'ticed in industry. Systems 
Safety involves applying scientific knowledge' and C'ngineering 
principles for timely identification and l'limination or control of all 
potential hazards within thC' systt'm. Tht' consideration of safl'tv 
of the system starts with original conct'ptual studi!•s and follow: 
through 'design, development, tt'sl, evaluation and opnation. 
Ideally al the end you " ·ill have a system which is free of hazards 
or in some cases, such as flight hardware', you have' pol controls 
on the hazards which cannot operationally hl' l'liminatC'd. 
:\ propnly functioning systC'ms safety program, not only in 
cryogenics systems but in any syslC'm will accomplish the follow-
ing: 
I . .-\dcquatt' !'Ontrols oYer known systems hazards which are 
inherent to the system have bPcn C'stablishC'd lo protect pC'rsonnl'I, 
equipment and property. 
l. \tinimum risk is involvC'd in the acceptance' and usC' ofnC'\\ 
methods and 'or materials. 
3. The rcquiremC'nt for retrofit actions (and their rC'sultant 
costs) for safety reasons have been rliminated. 
-t. \taximum safety, consistC'nt with opnational requirements, 
has been designC'd into the system. 
\le try to categoriz!' eal'h hazardous condition which could 
occur during a rC'aC'lor IC'st. Th!' c·atC'gorirs arc: safe, marginal, 
critil'al . and catastrophic . .-\ systC'ms safety program emphasizC's 
designing thl' syslC'm so if a malfunction oc·!·urs in onC' of thl'se 
categories there is a backup system or procf'durc to c·ontrol or 
eliminate' the malfunction. ,\ malfunc·tion should nrYcr c·ausc a 
degradation of the system from one l'alrgory lo th<' nrxl more 
serious category. Each systrm or subsysl!•m or c•omponcnl must 
have one or more levels of fail -safe rcdundan<·y. 
:\ gross hazard study is prrformed on l'ach system at the 
NRDS. This study is a quantitative non-malhC'mali<·al ass!'ssmC'nt 
of the safety features of the end it<·m. :\reas considned in this 
study include: 
1. Isolation of energy source's. 
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2. Fuels, propellants, gases and cryogenic materials, their 
characteristics, hazard category, handling, storage and transpor-
tation safety features, 
3. Systems environmental constraints. 
4. Use of potentially explosive devices. 
5. Compatibility of materials. 
6. Human factors. 
7. Use of pressure vessels and associated systems. 
8. Documentation concerning the safe operation and mainte-
nance of the facility. 
9. Training pertaining to all of the above. 
When a problem area in any one of the above categories is 
defined, a sequence of action is then taken to make the system as 
safe as possible. To satisfy safety engineering criteria this 
sequence is in the following order of preference; 
1. Design for Minimum Hazard. Every effort should be made 
during all phases of design to insure optimum safety through the 
selection of appropriate design features and qualified components. 
2. Safety Devices. Known hazards which cannot be eliminated 
by design selection shall be reduced to a minimum by designing 
appropriate safety devices into the system. 
3. Warning Devices. In those instances where it becomes 
impossible to preclude a known hazardous condition, appropriate 
devices shall be employed for detection of the condition and 
generation of an adequate warning signal. 
4. Special Emergency Procedures. In those instances where 
design considerations or use of safety and warning devices fail to 
reduce the magnitude of a known or potential hazard to an accept-
able level, special emergency procedures are provided. These 
procedures identify the hazardous period time span, actions 
required if such hazards occur, and special operating procedures 
to reduce possibility of occurrence. 
An example of each of thes~-would be: 
1. If, during a reactor run there occurs a discontinuity of 
coolant LH2 flow, damage could result to the reactor. A backup 
system has been installed which will automatically continue 
coolant flow should the flow from any primary coolant system be 
reduced for any reason. This system operates completely automa-
tically and separate from the main coolant system. The first level 
of fail -safe redundancy should always be an automatic reaction, 
not a manual one. 
2. We have a rather unique device to make certain H2 systems 
are completely independent of one another even though they share 
a common line. It is known as a double block and bleed. In this 
set up two block valves are installed, one downstream in the 
common line and one upstream in the main discharge line of the 
syslt'm bl'ing isolated. In the liquid hydrogen system gaseous 
helium at a slightly higher pressure than the hydrogen is thl'n 
injected into the line between the two valves. The pressure is then 
monitored and occasional samples of the gas are taken to assure 
no hydrogen seepage. In the gaseous hydrogen systems a bleed 
lin<' between the two block valves bleeds off any leaking gas to 
the facility burn stack. 
;L \laming devices are installC'd at certain strategic places 
throughout our IC'st complexes. These devices arC' of 11\"0 types. 
One for combustible gas to indicate a hydrogen leak and onC' to 
indiC'alc C'xccssivC' radiation. The hydrogen alarm is a siren, while 
thl' radiation alarm is a klaxon. The reason for two different 
audihlC' alarms is lo idC'ntify the type of emergl'ncy and the appro-
priate emergency action to be taken. These alarms not only sound 
locally hut aetivatC' alarms in locations such as the c•f'ntral fire 
station. Also during C'ertain tests, large' f'nclosC'd arC'as must be 
inl'rtecl lo preclude an C'xplosion should a hydrog<'n leak occur. 
PanC'ls equipped \\'ith alarms tell us when thl' oxygl'n <·onlenl in 
thf'se areas becomf's C'XCC'ssivC' or when a hydrogen leak has 
occurred. 
4. Emergency procedures exist for all f'mergencies which 
<'ould occur at the NHDS. ThC'sC' range from a fire lo an acC'idental 
criticality accident at a reactor. The. procedures are written simply 
and to the point. In the case of accidC'ntal criticality or hydrogen 
leaks the action to be takf'n is f'vacuation to a safe area. 
As can be readily seen, safety in cryogenics and systems 
takes on a wide variety of tasks to make' sure that all system.<; are 
ready and safe during_ tl'sts. The techniques and procedures for 
work-ing with large quantities of cryogenic materials at NRDS 
reflect the respect for safety that must accompany association with 
such materials. 
Nuclear Safety 
. ~uclear reactor and engine testing at the NRDS involves, in 
add1t1on to many of the same safety problems that chemical rockets 
have, the additional requirement that consideration be given to 
nuclear criticality, direct radiation and reactor effluent. 
Nuclear criticality safety involves the prevention of a nuclear 
e)(cursion or accidental reactor startup during the handling of fuel 
elements, assembly of reactor, pre-test checkout, test operations, 
disassembly or post mortem .operations. 
Direct radiation from a nuclear rocket reactor during full power 
operation is significant (approximately 100 R/hr. at 2700 ft. for a 
1000 MW reactor). This has, in the past been controlled entirely 
by use of isolation. The control point i.s 2Yz miles from the reactor. 
(Figure 1) In the future, with higher power reactors (up to 5000 
megawatts thermal), direct radiation from the reactor during power 
operation will be considerably reduced by a radiation shield around 
the core. Future tests of engine systems will be accomplished from 
a close-in, underground control room, providing personnel the 
protection that distance has provided in the past. 
Disassembly of a reactor after a test is accomplished to 
evaluate the effects of test on structural integrity, and fuel element 
erosion. Because of residual radioactivity in the reactor core due 
to fission product inventory, the disassembly operations and post 
mortem examinations are accomplished in a shielded building with 
remotely operated manipulators. 
Effluent in the form of radioactive particulate and gases is 
produced by the reactor during power operations by diffusion and 
corrosion processes. On-site and off-site radiation effects must be 
considered. 
Nuclear criticality safety is accomplished through the use of 
administrative limits and written procedures for all operations 
involving nuclear fuel material (U-235) plus physical control by 
volume limiting and nuclear poisoned containers, quantity limited 
· storage and transfer racks and multiple interlocking safety devices 
on the reactor. As an example, criticality control of the assembled 
reactor is accomplished through the use of electrical and mechan-
ical locks on the control rods, through isolation of the reactor from 
hydrogenous moderating material by double block and bleed 
(previously discussed) on all hydrogen lines and through positive 
isolation of the reactor from all water systems. 
Radiation safety is handled through review, inspections and 
audits to assure compliance of contractor procedures and activities 
with AEC established dose levels. Radiation monitoring and 
control is accomplished by the support services contractor, who 
supplies the monitoring services required for all NRDS activities. 
All personnel on the N RDS wear film badges from which we are 
able to evaluate individual exposures. 
We have an extensive effluent monitoring and evaluation 
program on the NRDS. The major objective of this program is to 
assure our capability for adequate prediction, measurement and 
evaluation of potential or actual radiological hazards generated as 
a result of reactor test operations at the NRDS. This capability is 
necessary to assure that radiation, both on and off-site is mini -
mized, and that adequate documentation of radiation levels is 
accomplished. 
Pre-run predictions of radiaoctive effluent transport and 
diffusion are used as a criteria for final test approval. These 
predictions are presently being made on the basis of weather 
forecasts tailored for this application plus the use of diffusion 
equations describing downwind dilution of reactor effluent. The 
required weather forecast consists of the spatial and temporal 
variations of the winds from the surface to approximately 15,000 
ft. MSL, the temperature structure of the atmosphere through this 
same layer and the probability of rain along the predicted trajec- · 
tory. This forecast provides the input required to predict the 
behavior of the radioactive effluent. Dose predictions are deter-
mined for whole body external gamma, iodine inhalation and iodine 
dose to the thyroid through the cow-milk chain. 
Gamma monitoring is accomplished with remote readout 
instrumentation at close-in locations and with thermoluminescent 
dosimeters at distances out to 25 miles. 
Air monitoring is accomplished by coll~cting air samples on 
charcoal impregnated filters. For this we use portable battery 
powered air sampling equipment. Filters are evaluated for iostopes 
of iodine by use of radio chemical separation and analysis on a 
gamma spectrometer . 
. Fresh milk samples are collected from farms and dairies in 
downwind sector following each test. These are also evaluated f~r 
radioactive iodines by use of a gamma spectrometer. Computation 
of isotope quantities is performed by use of a digital computer. 
Many experiments related to the NRDS effluent program are 
conducted by development contractors. Typical are experiments 
such as fission product or exhaust stream monitoring. 
Fission product release experim-ents conducted in the labora-
tory involve heating of fuel elements to determine their fission 
product release characteristics as a function of temperature. The 
data obtained is used in conjunction with a digital computer code to 
"' obtain total release predictions for a particular reactor test. These 
release predictions are used in conjunction with the diffusion 
equa.tions and existing m:eteoroligical conditions, as previously 
mentioned, to obtain the predictions for downwind radiation effects. 
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A further consideration in determining possible radiation 
effects is the fission product inventory of the reactor. This .in-
creases proportionately to the integrated power and is of maj~r 
importance in this evaluation. In this respect the safety of a cold 
clean reactor is best illustrated by results derived from a test that 
was conducted at the NRDS in January 1965. This test involved a 
standard 1000 MW reactor with special control devices to produce 
a high speed insertion of reactivity and a ~orresponding reactor 
excursion of maximum proportion. This was purposely designed to 
produce a much greater effect than that which could be expected 
from an accident involving a ground test reactor or engine under 
any conceivable circumstance. The total fissions in this planned 
excursion were a factor of two higher than any ·conceivable acci-
dent with a 5000 MW reactor system. Even with an excursion of 
this magnitude there would be no exposure to personnel exceeding 
AEC guide levels at distances beyond one mile from the test 
location. (Figure 5) The possibility of a reactor excursion acci-
dently occurring is infinitesimally small due to the use of multiple 
criticality control systems and strict administrative control. 
Con cl us ions 
Reactor testing at the N RDS to date has not resulted in 
radiation exposure to on-site or off-site personnel exceeding AEC 
guide levels. However, we at SNPO-N, as well as our Users and 
Contractors, have not been without our problems both radiolog-
ically and cryogenically. Fortunately however, none of our 
incidents have been of a serious nature. We in Safety at the NRDS 
have attempted to keep up with the giant strides which nuclear 
technology has taken in recent months. 
Safety, in a very technical sense, has by necessity played a 
significant part in the growth and progress of the Nuclear Rocket 
Development Station. 
The new hybrid technology in practice at the NRDS presents 
the key to future progress in space exploration without compromis-
ing the safety of those who work intimately with that technology. 
NUCLEAR ROCKET DEVELOPMENT 
STATION LAYOUT 
ETS-1 
E-MAD* 
1i ) i--
SUPPORT AREA 
TEST CELL "C" 
CONTROL POINT 
FIGURE I 
18-28 
TEST CELL "A" 
CHECK STATION 
- PROPELLANT 
MIXING (COMBUSTION) 
CHAMBER 
<CIHIJElMIJI<CAL 
~-TURBO PUMP 
NOZZLE 
FIGURE 2 
18-29 
....---TURBO PUMP 
REACTOR 
BOOTSTRAP 
NOZZLE 
W-UCCJLJEAR 
FIGURE 3 
18-30 
....... 
00 
I 
CJ.:l 
....... 
L-1 
L-103 
L- 53 
r r r w .. ~, - - - -'-----<><>--<> 
X-171 
N-JO~ w H~IOO~m 
>-3-01! - K·30Z 
j I ~OE:~ IC- 106 ~~~~ <T·I06 K-6 ~·-· 
BAL ANCE PISTON 
INTEASEALBLEED 
BALANCE PISTON 
L- 109 
H- 145 
L-111 
K-7 X-203 
LP - 12 
;; 
ToCorlLNz 
Rth ... nc• 
~l-301 l 1oRod tupply f A.ctuato~ ' z 
Z - 2!> 1 Tn Rod• Pnnmal!c ~Lock1n9P1n• 
1111 C•ll ·c· Cootrol 100111 Flow Scbmt1tlc 
612/66 
6123166 REVIS/OH l 
!io'27/H REVISION 2 
11/14/66 REVIS/OH 3 
1118161 REVISION<f 
4:T V. Boom'"'" LPGNz Supply ~~:,":' ' Gun 
~_,., T- 1 ~=:f ~~~111 .. 00 o.~,. I FIRE l 
1 WATER I L.._~OP J 
W- 3111:" ~ 
WF-4&4.IW-49 ;~::.~•I S>l••-T•" C.11 R~I ~::: ;:~~: 
.:.:-::;,.~'.':'.~ .. ''"· '" ' 
~N1u01t ..: l . Aciuo t or1 
FIGURE 4 
...... 
00 
I 
~ 
t..,j 
0.9 RAU 
TRANSIENT NUCLEAR TEST EXCURSION - RADIATION EXPOSURES 
FIGUHE 5 
I Mile 
1200' ~ f: / 600'' \ 
""" ' 'f (' II '"("• + est ,e , 25 150 ) ) 11:\IJ HALk I 
Control+ 
Point 
GAMMA AND NEUTRON INTEGRATED 
EXPOSURES INCLUDING GAMMA EXPOSURE 
FROM CLOUD PASSAGE FOR THE TRANSIENT 
NUCLEAR TEST EXCURSION SUPERIMPOSED 
ON TEST CELL "C° 0 AT THE NRDS. 
+ Test Cell 00 A0 • 
2000 Feet 4000 Feet 
I I 
